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ould we be better off if the Fe d e ral Re s e r ve had
an inﬂation ta rget or a price-level ta rget?  In a
p revious paper, Dittmar et al. (1999a) used a simple
Phillips Curve model and evidence about the pers i s-
tence in output gaps to show that a price-leve l - ta rg e t-
ing regime would likely result in a better inﬂa t i o n -
output variability tradeoff than an inﬂa t i o n - ta rg e t i n g
re g i m e.  That was an extension of work by Sve n s s o n
(1999).  The Phillips Curve speciﬁcation was consis-
tent with one derived from a Lucas Island model
with persistent supply shocks or a Fischer (1977)
wa g e - c o n t racting model.  McCallum (1994) re f e rs to
this as a Neoclassical Phillips Curve because it is con-
sistent with the Natural Rate Hypothesis (NRH)—
m o n e tary policy cannot keep output permanently
a b ove its natural rate because only unanticipated
m o n e tary policy affects real output.   
K i l ey (1998) argues that the Neoclassical speciﬁc a-
tion is inconsistent with U.S. data because he believe s
t h e re is historical evidence that anticipated moneta r y
p o l i cy has had real effects.  He attributes Sve n s s o n ’s
(1999) favo rable ﬁnding for price-level ta rgeting to his
choice of Phillips Curve speciﬁcation.  Kiley concludes
that, compared to the case with inﬂation ta rg e t i n g ,
p r i c e - l evel ta rgeting would have been found to re s u l t
in a wo rse inﬂation-output variability tradeoff if Sve n s -
son had started with a New - Keynesian ve rsion of the
Phillips Curve.  Kiley derives the ex p e c tation for the
mean of output in a New - Keynesian model, shows
that the ex p e c tation depends on the lagged price leve l ,
and infers from this that trying to sta b i l i ze the price
l evel would raise the variability of output.  He does not
d e r i ve the inﬂation-output variability tradeoff implied
by the model nor does he experiment with alternative
p o l i cy rules using his New - Keynesian speciﬁc a t i o n .
In this paper, we extend the analysis of price-leve l
ta rgeting of Dittmar et al. (1999a) to a model including
the New - Keynesian Phillips curve recommended by
K i l ey.  We examine the inﬂation-output va r i a b i l i t y
t ra d e o f fs implied by optimal inﬂation and price-leve l
r u l e s.  To be consistent with our earlier work and that of
S vensson (1999), we assume that lagged output enters
the aggregate supply function.  The introduction of lags
is consistent with both the theoretical model of Tay l o r
(1980) who includes both leads and lags of unemploy-
m e n t in the Phillips Curve and the empirical work of
Roberts (1995), who ﬁnds serial correlation in the
e r ror terms of his estimated Phillips Curve s.  
Our intuition is that price-level ta rgeting should
be pre f e rable in a sticky-price world where prices 
a re costly to adjust.  If prices we re perfectly ﬂex i b l e,
a l t e r n a t i ve monetary policy rules would have almost
no effect on real output.  But in a world where it is
costly to adjust prices, a policy that reduces price ﬂu c-
tuations would seem to be appro p r i a t e.  Indeed, we
ﬁnd that the New - Keynesian Phillips Curve prov i d e s
even stronger support for price-level ta rgeting than
did the model with the Neoclassical Phillips Curve.
In previous work with the Neoclassical Phillips
C u r ve, we found that the choice between inﬂa t i o n
ta rgeting and price-level ta rgeting depended on the
amount of persistence in the output gap.  That is, if the
output gap was not too persistent, or if lagged output
did not enter the aggregate supply function, then inﬂa-
t i o n ta rgets we re pre f e r red to price-level ta rg e t s.
Empirical ev i d e n c e, howeve r, showed a very high leve l
of persistence in the output gap, suggesting that price-
l evel ta rgets offer the policy m a ker a better menu of
t ra d e o f fs between output and inﬂation va r i a b i l i t y.
To prev i ew the results in this article, we show
that when we start with a New - Keynesian Phillips
C u r ve, the amount of persistence in the output gap
still affects the re l a t i ve placement of the inﬂa t i o n -
output variability tradeoff.  Contrary to the Neoclassical
c a s e, howeve r, even where the persistence of the out-
put gap in the aggregate supply function is small or
n o n existent, the price-level ta rgeting regime still
results in a more favo rable tradeoff between output
and inﬂation variability than does an inﬂa t i o n -
ta rgeting re g i m e.  
In the ﬁrst section, we brieﬂy describe the New -
Keynesian model and compare it to the Neoclassical
s p e c i ﬁcation.  In the second section, we construct
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the inﬂation-output variability curves implied by
a l t e r n a t i ve para m e t e r i zations of the model.  In the
conclusion, we discuss the assumptions that are
a p p a rently needed to ﬁnd that price-level ta rg e t i n g
would desta b i l i ze output.  
A NEW-KEYNESIAN PHILLIPS CURVE
We begin with the same inﬁn i t e - h o r i zon qua-
d ratic loss function used in our earlier work.  The
c e n t ral bank with an inﬂation ta rget minimize s
( 1 )
w h e re the superscript A re f e rs to the loss function of
an inﬂation ta rgeting central bank, b is the centra l
b a n k ’s discount fa c to r, y t is the deviation of output
f rom the ta rget level, and (pt–p*) is the deviation of
i n ﬂation from the central bank’s inﬂation ta rget.  The
term, l, gives the weight on output gap re l a t i ve to the
weight on inﬂation in the central bank’s loss function.
The Neoclassical Phillips Curve used in our ear-
lier paper is given by 
( 2 )
w h e re r determines the persistence in the output
gap, a determines the response of the output gap to
unanticipated inﬂation, and et is an independent and
identically distributed technology shock with mean
ze ro and variance s2
e.  We are making no distinction
b e t ween the aggregate supply function and the
Phillips Curve.1
Roberts (1995) shows that the sticky price
models of Taylor (1980), Ro t e m b e rg (1982), and
C a l vo (1983) all imply the same Phillips Curve struc-
t u re that has been called New Keynesian.  Kiley
(1998) uses the Calvo model to derive the fo l l ow i n g
N ew - Keynesian Phillips Curve :
( 3 )
This is deceptively similar to the Neoclassical ve rs i o n
w h e re the anticipated inﬂation that enters the function
is the ex p e c tation for period t+1 rather than t.  Kiley
includes a discussion of the empirical support for this
s p e c i ﬁcation and a discussion of the re s e a rch that has
d eveloped microeconomic foundations for this a g g re-
gate relationship.  A compre h e n s i ve survey of the
implications for monetary policy implied by New - Key-
nesian theories can be found in Clarida et al. (1999).   
To solve this model, we must decide what to
assume about how the central bank ta kes account of its
effect on inﬂation ex p e c ta t i o n s.  Kydland and Pre s c o t t
(1977) showed that the presence of fo r wa rd - l o o k i n g
ex p e c tations in the central bank’s Phillips Curve
c o n s t raint causes a problem of time inconsistency if
the bank tries to manipulate those ex p e c ta t i o n s.
I n t u i t i ve l y, the problem of time inconsistency
h e re results from the ability of a bank facing a New -
Keynesian Phillips Curve to derive rewa rds to d ay by
c reating ex p e c tations for to m o r row.  When a new
period arrive s, the temptation is to confound ex p e c-
tations with new policy since the gains from the
p reviously announced policy already have been
ta ken.  In equilibrium, the central bank cannot ben-
e ﬁt from reneging on announced policies.  If the
bank re o p t i m i zes each period, or only occasionally,
then private agents will learn that the bank’s
announced future policy will not necessarily be
implemented.  When this occurs, the bank’s ability to
c o n t rol ex p e c tations will be lost.  Recent discussion
of this issue can be found in Wo o d fo rd (1999) and
Clarida et al. (1999).  To avoid this time inconsistency
p roblem, we assume that the central bank ta kes pri-
vate sector ex p e c tations as given.  Under this
assumption, the bank, recognizing that it may be
unable to commit to policy announcements, fo rg o e s
a ny attempt to manipulate private ex p e c ta t i o n s.
When the central bank re g a rds ex p e c tations as
g i ven, the bank’s optimization problem becomes a
s ta n d a rd one, with a quadratic objective and linear
c o n s t ra i n t s.  Furthermore, ﬁrs t - o rder conditions ta ke
a sta n d a rd form for all time periods, assuring policy
rules are time consistent.  Linear decision rules are
assumed for the bank’s optimal policy.  Upon substi-
tuting the assumed linear rules into the ﬁrst ord e r
conditions for the bank’s optimization problem, we
equate coefﬁcients on the variables in the decision
rules and derive the bank’s policy function.  We
assume that the bank, in taking ex p e c tations as
g i ven, bases its time t decisions on current sta t e s, yt– 1
and et, in both regimes and pt– 1 in the case of a price-
l eve l - ta rgeting re g i m e.  Expectations then are assumed
to be formed as a rational consequence of the bank’s
p o l i cy rule.
yt = r yt -1 +a (p t - tp t+1
e ) +et.












1 Some would call our equation an aggregate supply function because
the dependent variable is the output gap.  If the equation were
rearranged with inﬂation on the left-hand side, they would call it a
Phillips Curve.  King and Watson (1994) show that this distinction can
be important when estimating the parameters from historical data,
but it does not matter in our analytical work.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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The derivation of policy rules under an
i n ﬂa t i o n - ta rgeting regime closely fo l l ows the
d e r i vation in the appendix of Dittmar et al. 
(1999a).  The bank’s constrained optimiza t i o n
p roblem is given as:
( 4 )
with the mt’s being a sequence of random multipliers
and t+ipe
t+ 1 +i denotes the private secto r ’s inﬂa t i o n
ex p e c ta t i o n s.  Firs t - o rder conditions for the bank
ta ke the fo r m :
( 5 )
when ta ken with respect to the sequence of y t’s, and
the fo r m :
( 6 )
when ta ken with respect to the sequence of pt’s.
Eliminating the multipliers from these ex p re s s i o n s
g i ves the fo l l owing Euler equation:
( 7 )
H e re the central bank wants to smooth inﬂation dev i-
ations from ta rget with an adjustment for the curre n t
output gap.  If there is no persistence in the output
gap, then the desired inﬂation deviations to d ay
depend only on the output gap.
We now seek a linear decision rule for inﬂa t i o n
of the fo r m :
( 8 )
E x p e c tations of the private sector are assumed to be
rational, so at time t we have :
( 9 )
Substituting these ex p ressions into the Phillips
C u r ve equation and solving the resulting equa-
tion for y t yields a decision rule for y t d i rectly of 
the fo r m :
( 10 )
Decision rules are invariant so we can determine
pt +1 by iterating on the rule for pt to yield the
fo l l owing ex p re s s i o n :
( 11 )
Taking time t ex p e c tations then yields a linear ex p re s -
sion for Etpt +1.  If we now substitute the ex p re s s i o n s
for y t, pt, and pt +1 i n to the ﬁrs t - o rder condition and
equate constant terms and coefﬁcients on y t –1 and 
et, we obtain three equations that can be solved fo r
the unknown A1, A2, and A3.  
When the central bank ta kes inﬂation ex p e c ta -
tions as given, the ﬁrs t - o rder conditions for the inﬂa -
tion ta rgeting case are of the same form for both the
N ew Keynesian and Neoclassical speciﬁcations of the
Phillips Curve.  The reason is simply that the differe n c e
in the speciﬁcations is in the way ex p e c tations enter.
When different ex p ressions for the Phillips Curve
c o n s t raint and expected inﬂation for period t+1
(equations 10 and 11 for the New - Keynesian case) are
substituted back into the ﬁrs t - o rder conditions, h ow-
eve r, we get different monetary policy rules.  In the
N ew - Keynesian case, agents’ inﬂation ex p e c tations at
time t a re for inﬂation at time t+1 and invo l ve y t;
w h e reas in the Neoclassical case, inﬂation ex p e c ta t i o n s
at time t a re for inﬂation at time t and invo l ve y t – 1.
F i g u re 1 shows the inﬂation-output va r i a b i l i t y
t ra d e o f fs for the Neoclassical and New - Key n e s i a n
cases when the central bank has an inﬂation ta rg e t .
We graphically display the inﬂation/output va r i a b i l i t y
t ra d e o f fs in the two speciﬁcations by ﬁrst ex p re s s i n g
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the output gap variance and the inﬂation variance as
functions of the pre f e rence para m e t e r, l, while hold-
ing the para m e t e rs of the Phillips Curve consta n t .
For a given l, the bank’s decision rules can be used
to calculate an unconditional variance for both inﬂa-
tion and the output gap (a single point in Figure 1).
Va r ying the bank’s pre f e rences by varying l w i l l
d e t e r m i n e the location of the curve re p resenting the
t radeoff between s p
2 and sy
2.  
The para m e t e r i zations used here are the same as
the ones used by Dittmar et al. (1999a):  a=0.5, b= 0 . 9 9 ,
and r=0.9. These assumptions imply a Phillips Curve
slope of 0.2.2 We assume that the interest rate is 4 per-
cent at an annual ra t e, so the quarterly discount fa c -
tor is approximately 0.99. The variance of the output
shock is normalized to one in the ﬁg u re s.  As Figure 1
s h ows, the tradeoff is similar across the two model
s p e c i ﬁc a t i o n s, except for ex t reme cases where the
c e n t ral bank puts little weight on the deviation of
i n ﬂation from ta rget.  In the Neoclassical case, the
variance of inﬂation rises monotonically with l, the
re l a t i ve weight the central bank puts on the output
gap in its loss function.  In the New - Keynesian case,
with this para m e t e r i zation, the curve bends back;
that is, inﬂation variability stops rising and begins to
decline when the central bank has a very strong pre f-
e rence for output stability (after l goes above thre e ) .
I n ﬂation variability begins to rise again at very high
values of l (this second reve rsal is not discernable in
F i g u re 1).  We do not have any intuition about why
this curve is oddly shaped when the central bank
puts high weight on reducing variability of the output
gap.  Note, howeve r, Cecchetti, McConnell, and Quiro s
(1999) estimated lto be less than 0.33 (by our deﬁn i t i o n
of l) for the countries in the European Monetary Union.
The interesting question is what happens when
the central bank ta rgets the price level instead of the
i n ﬂation ra t e.  Under an inﬂa t i o n - ta rgeting re g i m e, the
equilibrium results in a price level that has a ra n d o m -
walk component.  In statistical jargon, the time-series
for the logarithm of the price level has a unit ro o t .
With a price-level objective, the equilibriumresults in a
time series for the price level that is stationary about a
deterministic trend—which may or may not be grow i n g ,
depending on the underlying desired inﬂation ra t e.
With a price-level objective, the problem becomes more
complicated.  We revise the loss function to re ﬂect the
c e n t ral bank’s pre f e rence for a price-level objective :
( 1 2 )
w h e re the price level, p, has replaced the inﬂa t i o n
rate and the superscript B denotes a loss function in
the price level rather than the inﬂation ra t e.   
Determining decision rules for the bank in the
case of price-level ta rgeting proceeds in a similar
manner as in the case of inﬂation ta rgeting, but is
complicated by the presence of two lagged-state va r i-
ables in the bank’s Phillips Curve, yt–1 and pt–1.  The
b a n k ’s ﬁrs t - o rder condition in this case will invo l ve
i n ﬁnite sums of future price levels and output gaps.
To simplify the derivation of these conditions, we
ﬁrst deﬁne the new variable p ~
t=pt _ pt
*.
The New - Keynesian Phillips Curve will ta ke the
fo r m
( 1 3 )
in the tra n s formed price va r i a b l e.  We can now fo r m
the bank’s Lagrangian as:
( 1 4 )
with, once again, the mt’s being a sequence of ra n d o m
m u l t i p l i e rs.  Firs t - o rder conditions when ta ken with
respect to the sequence of yt’s now ta ke the fo r m
( 1 5 )
and when ta ken with respect to the sequence of p ~
t’s
n ow ta ke the fo r m
( 1 6 )
We get a sequence of ﬁrs t - o rder conditions ex p re s s e d
in terms of state va r i a b l e s.  At each point in time i we
get the fo r m
( 1 7 )
Calculating decision rules for the bank now pro c e e d s
in a similar manner to the calculation of decision 
rules for an inﬂa t i o n - ta rgeting central bank.  Deta i l s
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We then calculated the inﬂation-output tra d e o f f
implied by varying l, the bank’s re l a t i ve pre f e rence fo r
output sta b i l i t y, between ze ro and inﬁn i t y.  Figure 2
s h ows that the inﬂation-output variability tra d e o f fs
almost are identical for the two ve rsions of the Phillips
C u r ve when there is a high degree of persistence in
t he output gap.  We are not interested really in distin-
guishing between these alternative views of the
Phillips Curve.  We want to respond to the suggestion
that price-level ta rgeting would not work well under
the New - Keynesian speciﬁcation.  Figures 3 through 5
s h ow the inﬂation-output variability tra d e o f fs implied
by the New - Keynesian speciﬁcation for three alterna-
t i ve values of r, our measure of persistence in the
output gap.  The ﬁrst case compares inﬂation ta rg e t i n g
with price-level ta rgeting for what we believe is a
realistic amount of pers i s t e n c e, r= 0 . 9 . This case i s
s h own in Figure 3, which shows that the price-leve l
ta rget results in a better inﬂation-output va r i a b i l i t y
t radeoff than does an inﬂation ta rget.  F i g u re 4 shows
that price-level ta rgeting still dominates i n ﬂa t i o n
ta rgeting when r=0.5.  In the Neoclassical c a s e, the
t ra d e o f fs we re identical in this case.  As r fa l l sb e l ow
0.5, the inﬂation ta rget came to dominate the price-
l evel ta rget in our earlier analys i s.  In contrast, Figure
5 shows that, under the New - Keynesian speciﬁc a t i o n ,
i n ﬂation ta rgeting results in a wo rse tradeoff betwe e n




Figure 52 6 MA RC H/ AP R I L 2 0 0 0
R E V I E W
In summary, Dittmar et al. (1999a), assuming a
Neoclassical Phillips Curve, found that price-level ta r-
geting dominated inﬂation ta rgeting for cases where
the output gap was re l a t i vely persistent; that is, when
r>0.5.  In this article, we ﬁnd that when we use a
N ew - Keynesian Phillips Curve, price-level ta rg e t i n g
dominates inﬂation ta rgeting for all values of l, eve n
if we omit the lagged output gap from the aggre g a t e
supply function.
IT’S NOT THE PHILLIPS CURVE, 
IT’S EXPECTATIONS FORMATION
Our results raise an important issue.  Simulations
of econometric models typically ﬁnd that ta rg e t i n g
the price level is a bad idea.  Economists have attrib-
uted this result to the presence of nominal rigidities
such as wage contracts or price adjustment costs.  Ye t
in these econometric ex p e r i m e n t s, inﬂation ex p e c ta-
tions almost always are assumed to be formed adap-
t i ve l y.  For exa m p l e, Haldane and Salmon (1995) use
a small econometric model with adaptive inﬂa t i o n
ex p e c tations to examine whether monetary policy
ta rgets for price stability should be ex p ressed in
l evels or rates of change.  They ﬁnd that price-leve l
ta rgeting results in higher short-run variability fo r
both inﬂation and output growth.  These results are
typical of econometric model simulations with back-
wa rd-looking ex p e c ta t i o n s.3 
T h e re are at least two examples where centra l
bank economists conducted experiments with price-
l evel ta rgets using econometric models modiﬁed to
include some fo r wa rd-looking behav i o r.  Black,
Macklem, and Rose (1997) look at combination rules
that combine a long-term price-level objective with a
short-term inﬂa t i o n - ta rgeting rule.  The presence of
an erro r - c o r rection term guarantees the eve n t u a l
return of the price level to its long-run ta rget path.
For some values of the erro r - c o r rection para m e t e r
b e t ween 0.1 and 0.125, they derive an inﬂa t i o n -
output variability tradeoff that is better than with the
i n ﬂation rule alone.  Using a policy model estimated
at the Board of Gove r n o rs of the Fe d e ral Re s e r ve
S ystem, Williams (1999) ﬁnds “intere s t i n g l y, ta rg e t i n g
the price level rather than the inﬂation rate genera t e s
little additional cost in terms of output and inﬂa t i o n
va r i a b i l i t y.  Under price-level ta rgeting, the ex p e c ta t i o n s
channel helps sta b i l i ze inﬂation, there by eliminating
much of the output sta b i l i zation costs that wo u l d
otherwise be associated with reve rsing deviations of
the price level from its ta rget.”  Williams conﬁr m s
our view that the reason price-level ta rgeting fa res 
so badly in econometric simulations is that this is
exactly the type of exe rcise for which the Lucas Cri-
tique is likely to be most re l evant.  The policy rules
that we re most efﬁcient in reducing inﬂation and
output variability when the model assumes fo r wa rd -
looking ex p e c ta t i o n s, turn out to be the wo rst when
ﬁxed adaptive ex p e c tations are assumed.  And, vice-
ve rsa, policies that are efﬁcient when ex p e c ta t i o n s
a re assumed to be adaptive do poorly when ex p e c ta-
tions are fo r wa rd looking.  Assumptions about
ex p e c tations are critical for the analys i s.   
We focus on an ex t reme comparison in our
a n a l ys i s, inﬂation ta rgeting ve rsus price-level ta rg e t i n g .
Our results suggest that ta rgeting the price level in
the short run may work better than previously thought.
But these results should be put into pers p e c t i ve.  We
do not have enough conﬁdence in our know l e d g e
about the short-run dynamics of the economy to re c-
ommend that any central bank adopt a policy rule
that would re p resent a sharp break with current pra c -
t i c e.  Ra t h e r, the role of the price-level ta rget is to pro-
vide a long-term anchor for the monetary sys t e m .
Dittmar et al. (1999b) showed that a central bank can
d ramatically reduce the uncertainty about inﬂa t i o n
i n h e rent in an inﬂa t i o n - ta rgeting regime by 1) adopt-
ing a long-term price-level objective, and 2) using it
in an erro r - c o r rection fra m ework to modify the
short-run inﬂation ta rg e t s.  That analysis was based
on an aggregate model including the Neoclassical
Phillips Curve.  But as we have shown here, the
results would not be substantially different if we 
had started with a New - Keynesian speciﬁc a t i o n .
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Appendix
SOLUTION FOR THE CASE OF PRICE-LEVEL TARGETING
The central bank’s constrained optimization
problem with a price-level objective is given as the
Lagrangian (equation 14 in the text):
(A1)
where the mt’s are a sequence of random multipli-
ers.  First-order conditions when taken with respect
to the sequence of yt’s now take the form
(A2)
and when taken with respect to the sequence of pt’s
now take the form
(A3)
We have found the simplest way to eliminate multi-
pliers from the bank’s ﬁrst-order conditions is to
regard both sequences above as linear systems in
the unknown multipliers.  The sequence of ﬁrst-
order conditions derived as a result of differentiat-
ing the Lagrangian with respect to the sequence of
yt’s can be written as the linear system
(A4)
while the other sequence of ﬁrst-order conditions
can be written as the linear system
(A5)
These systems can be solved for the unknown mul-
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Thus, we can conclude from the ﬁrst set of ﬁrst-
order conditions that
(A8)
for i = 0,..., , and we can conclude from the sec-
ond set that
(A9)
for i = 0,..., .  Equating the two ex p ressions for the
u n k n ow n multipliers gives the following sequence
of ﬁrst-order conditions expressed solely in terms
of state variables:
(A10)
Calculating decision rules for the bank now pro-
ceeds in a similar manner to the calculation of
decision rules for an inﬂa t i o n - ta rgeting central bank.
When decisions are made at time t, the bank’s sta t e
variables are yt –1, p ~
t–1, and et.  We assume linear deci-
sion rules of the form B1p ~
t –1+B2yt –1+B3etfor yt a n d
A1p ~
t –1+A2y t –1+A3et for p ~
t.  Using the rational ex p e c ta-




t+A2y t, and the Phillips
C u r ve equation allows us to relate the coefﬁcients of
the decision rule for y t to those in the rule for p ~
t.  Iter-
ating these decision rules fo r wa rd and ta k i n g
ex p e c tations allows us to write both Etp ~
t + n a n d
Ety t + n as a linear function of yt –1, p ~
t –1 and et.  In gen-
e ral, we have
(A11)
(A12)
with the coefﬁcients Ai
(n) and Bi
(n) for i = 1, 2, 3,
determined itera t i vely as:
(A13)
Since this is a linear difference equation in Ai
(n)and
Bi
(n), we explicitly solve it in the form
(A14)
where u1, u2, v1, and v2 are the eigenvalues and eigen-
vectors respectively of the matrix
(A15)
expressed as algebraic functions of the unknown deci-
sion rule parameters A1, A2, B1, and B2.  With this
representation we can substitute into the ﬁrst-order
condition, explicitly sum the resulting geometric
series on the supposition that both u1 and u2 are 
less than 1 in absolute value, and ﬁnally equate coefﬁ-
cients on state variables.  We have found the resulting
equations for the coefﬁcients in the decision rules 
to be too algebraically complex to admit a closed 
form solution.  We have solved them numerically 
for a range of parameters, however.  We found that
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